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1 Introduction
It is well known in modern Industrial Organization that in a Hotelling game with price
competition, firms will be maximally horizontally diﬀerentiated in order to reduce the
competitive pressure. The press industry, however, derives revenue from both readers and
advertising, where the latter depends positively on circulation. This gives each newspaper
an incentive to locate close to its rival in order to increase its readership and thus its
advertising revenue. As shown by Gabszewicz et al. (2001, 2002), newspapers become
minimally horizontally diﬀerentiated if advertisers’ willingness to pay is suﬃciently high
and readers are indiﬀerent to advertising.
The purpose of this note is to analyze how readers’ attitude towards advertising aﬀect
the profile of competing newspapers. To this end we extend Gabszewicz et al. 2001 by
allowing readers to be ad lovers or ad haters.1 When readers dislike ads, newspapers
will have less advertising than what maximizes advertising revenue. Hence, advertising
finance has less of an impact as a moderator on each newspaper’s profile. It may therefore
not be surprising that newspapers become more diﬀerentiated in this case. One might be
inclined to expect that the opposite would be true when readers are ad lovers. However,
our main finding is that the incentive to moderate content is weakened also if readers
like advertising. The reason for this is that the newspapers then choose a higher level of
advertising than what maximizes advertising receipts. This strengthens the newspapers’
incentive to diﬀerentiate their profile in the same way as when readers dislike ads.
2 Model
Readers can choose between two newspapers, which are located on the Hotelling line. The
location of the newspapers is given by θ1 = a and θ2 = 1 − b, where (1− b) ≥ a. The
newspapers are perfect (horizontal) substitutes if (1− b) = a , while they are maximally
(horizontally) diﬀerentiated if a = b = 0.
Readers diﬀer with respect to their preference for editorial stance as measured by θ,
1Both attitudes have been verified empircially. See Sonnac (2000) on newspaper readers’ attitudes and
Depken II and Wilson, (2004) for attitudes among magazine readers.
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which is uniformly distributed on the unit-interval. The utility of a θ-type reader who
consumes newspaper i = 1, 2 equals
ui = v − t (θi − θ)2 − pi − γai, (1)
where pi is the price readers pay per copy of newspaper i, and ai is the advertising volume.
The readers suﬀer a utility loss when the newspaper’s editorial content θi diﬀers from their
most preferred profile (θ) , and the utility loss is given by the quadratic function t (θi − θ)2,
t > 0. Readers dislike advertisements when γ > 0, whilst they appreciate them when γ < 0.
As such pi + γai can be interpreted as the hedonic price readers pay per newspaper. The
parameter v > 0 is assumed to be suﬃciently large to ensure market coverage (such that
each consumer buys one newspaper).
Let ni be the number of readers of newspaper i. We express the number of readers of
newspaper i in terms of the utility they derive from reading that newspaper. Therefore ni
is a non-decreasing function of ui and defined as
ni = φ(ui),
where ∂φ/∂ui ≥ 0.
Advertisers benefit from informing readers about the existence and characteristics of
their product, and the net benefit for a firm of type α from advertising in newspaper i is
Bi = αni − si, (2)
where si is the price for an ad in newspaper i. We assume that the advertisers are price tak-
ers, and that α is distributed on [0, 1] with density 4k. The induced demand for advertising
is then2
ai = 4k (1− si/ni) . (3)
The marginal cost for the newspaper of inserting an ad is normalized to zero, while the
marginal cost of printing and distributing a newspaper copy is c ≥ 0. This means that the
profit level of newspaper i in terms of utilities equals
πi = siai + ni (pi − c) = siai + φ(ui) (pi − c) . (4)
2The platform has a monopoly power over its readers as an advertiser can only contact a potential
customer who reads newspaper i by placing an advert in that newspaper. Thus each newspaper firm is a
competitive bottleneck (see Armstrong 2006).
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We consider a game where the newspapers simultaneously and non-cooperatively choose
their ideological stance at stage 1. At stage 2 each newspaper maximizes profit with respect
to utility, as in Armstrong (2006), while they select advertising prices at stage 3. We focus
on subgame-perfect equilibria which exhibit positive newspaper prices.
At stage 3 each newspaper maximizes profits with respect to si keeping readers’ utility
ui constant. At an interior solution, the first-order condition isµ
ai + si
∂ai
∂si
¶
+ φ(ui)
∂pi
∂si
¯¯¯¯
dui=0
= 0. (5)
From equations (1) and (3) it follows that ∂ai∂si =
4k
φi
and ∂pi∂si
¯¯¯
dui=0
= γ4kφi
, so that the
third-stage equilibrium advertising price and the associated amount of advertising are
si = (1 + γ)
φi
2
and ai = 2k (1− γ) . (6)
To ensure that the non-negativity constraint on the advertising price and the amount of
advertising are not binding, we impose |γ| < 1 throughout. Total advertising revenue for
newspaper i is given by
ωi = siai = k˜φi, where k˜ = k
¡
1− γ2
¢
. (7)
From equation (7) we see that optimal advertising revenue is increasing in the size of the
audience (φi = ni), and that optimal per-reader advertising revenue k˜ is decreasing in |γ| .
It is also evident from equation (7) that advertising revenue (ωi) is maximized if consumers
are indiﬀerent to ads (γ = 0). Hence, there is a humped-shaped relationship between γ
and ωi with a peak at γ = 0.
The humped-shaped relationship is illustrated in Figure 1. If the audience is ad-averse
(γ > 0), it is optimal for each newspaper to choose a relatively low advertising level in
order to attract readers (confer (6)). Although the newspaper charges a higher advertising
price than when γ = 0, total advertising revenue is lower. If readers like advertising (γ < 0)
it is optimal for the newspaper to have a higher level of advertising (and charge a lower
advertising price) than the quantity which maximizes advertising revenue.
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Figure 1: Advertising revenues.
At stage 2 newspaper i maximizes profit with respect to ui, taking into account how
advertising levels will be aﬀected at stage 3. Formally, it solves ui = argmaxπi, where
πi (ui, uj) = k˜φi(ui) + φi(ui) (pi − c) ; i 6= j. (8)
The willingness to pay for newspaper 1 is greater than for newspaper 2 for all consumers
satisfying
u1 − t (a− θ)2 − γa1 > u2 − t (1− b− θ)2 − γa2.
Using that a1 = a2 we thus find that demand for the two newspapers is given by
φ1 = a+
u1 − u2
2t (1− a− b) +
1− a− b
2
and φ2 = 1− b+
u2 − u1
2t (1− a− b) +
1− a− b
2
, (9)
where the demand functions resemble standard Hotelling demand functions, except that
they are expressed in terms of utilities instead of prices.
At the first stage the newspapers maximize (8) subject to (9), and it can be shown
that there exists an equilibrium with full diﬀerentiation if and only if k˜ < c + t/2.3 An
3We omit the details of the computations and refer the reader to Gabszewicz et al. (2001) and, in
particular, to Gabszewicz et al. (2002). The same steps apply here if we substitute k for k˜ (thus allowing
for the possibility that γ 6= 0).
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important implication is that, since k˜ is decreasing in |γ| (see above), a full diﬀerentiation
equilibrium will more likely emerge the more strongly readers (dis)like advertising:
Proposition 1 Newspapers are more likely to locate at the extremes of the profile spectrum
the stronger the readers’ attitude towards advertising, i.e. the larger |γ|.
Behind this result is the fact that advertising revenues are lower the more readers care
(positively or negatively) about the level of advertising in newspapers (confer Figure 1).
Each newspaper therefore faces less of an incentive to moderate its profile in order to be
an attractive media outlet for advertisers.
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